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Abstract
How does entry affect productivity growth of incumbents? In this paper we exploit policy
reforms in the United Kingdom that changed entry conditions by opening up the U.K.
economy during the 1980s and panel data on British establishments to shed light on this
question. We show that more entry, measured by a higher share of industry employment in
foreign ﬁrms, has led to faster total factor productivity growth of domestic incumbent ﬁrms
and thus to faster aggregate productivity growth. (JEL: L5, L10, O31, O4)
1. Introduction
The entry and exit of ﬁrms is widely thought to be a major driver of productivity
growth. New ﬁrms can be an important way for new products and new
production methods to be introduced into markets and can drive out poor
performers. The entry of new ﬁrms can also spur incumbent ﬁrms to improve
productivity, in an attempt to escape entry. This latter effect has only recently
received more attention in the empirical literature considering productivity
growth in developed countries.
1
One strand of empirical literature this paper relates to has focused on the
impact of entry and exit through changing the composition of ﬁrms operating in
Acknowledgment: This work contains statistical data from the ONS, which is Crown Copyright
and reproduced with the permission of the controller of HMSO and Queen’s Printer for Scotland
(under license number C02W0002702). The use of the ONS statistical data in this work does not
imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data.
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1. A notable earlier exception is Olley and Pakes (1996), who did not ﬁnd support for signiﬁcant
within plant growth in productivity as a result of the deregulation in the U.S. telecommunication
equipment industry involving substantial entry and exit.
Journal of the European Economic Association April–May 2004 2(2–3):265–276
© 2004 by the European Economic Associationan industry.
2 These papers report accounting decompositions of the overall
change in productivity growth, attributing shares to incumbents, entrants, and
exitors. The ﬁndings suggest that a substantial share of productivity growth
comes from growth within incumbent ﬁrms. Much of this incumbent growth
could be due to the impact of entry. A different literature we relate to asks about
the effects of entry liberalization and whether these are desirable. On the one
hand, advocates of entry and trade liberalization have argued that, by increasing
the size of markets and by fostering product market competition, liberalization
enhances growth.
3 Others have instead argued that liberalization can be detri-
mental to growth, by inhibiting infant industries and learning-by-doing.
4 The
empirical literature looking at trade liberalization has found mixed results for
developing countries. For example, Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti
(2003), or ABRZ, ﬁnd positive effects of liberalization on economic perfor-
mance across manufacturing sectors and states in India over the last decade.
Aitken and Harrison (1999) provide no support for such an effect on domestic
plant productivity using plant-level data for Venezuela. Pavnick (2002) ﬁnds
that plant productivity in import-competing manufacturing sectors increases by
three to ten percent more than in nontraded-goods sectors after the Chilean trade
liberalization during the 1970s.
In this paper we derive empirical predictions from a multisector Schumpe-
terian growth model with entry at the technological frontier, in which the
various sectors of the economy differ with respect to their initial state of
technological development, measured by their distance to the technological
frontier. A higher entry threat can be shown to encourage innovation in sectors
that are initially close to the technological frontier, whereas it may discourage
innovation in sectors that are initially far below the technological frontier. The
intuition for these two effects is as follows. In the former case, ﬁrms close to the
frontier know they can escape entry by innovating. Therefore, a higher threat of
entry will result in more intensive innovation activities aimed at escaping that
threat. In the latter case, ﬁrms far below the frontier have no hope to win against
a potential entrant, and therefore the only effect of an increased entry threat is
to reduce the ﬁrms’ expected payoff from investing in R&D. Productivity
growth by incumbent ﬁrms will be affected by entry threat through its effect on
innovation incentives and the average rate of productivity among incumbent
ﬁrms can be shown to increase in entry threat.
To explore the latter issue we exploit rich microlevel panel data on British
establishments in 166 four-digit manufacturing industries during the time period
2. See Disney, Haskel, and Heden (2003) and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001).
3. See, for example, Collier and Dollar (2001), Dollar and Kraay (2001, 2002), Frankel and
Romer (1999), and Sachs and Warner (1995).
4. See Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2003), Banerjee and Newman (2003), Hausman and
Rodrik (2002), Krugman (1981), Stiglitz (1996, 2002), and Young (1991).
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mation on foreign entry, since entrants from abroad are most likely to be
technologically advanced. We use cross-industry and time series variation in
U.K. product market regulation that is triggered by the introduction of the E.U.
Single Market Program (SMP) at the end of the 1980s and variation in the
technological situation abroad to control for the potential endogeneity of entry.
Taking endogeneity issues into account is important since entrants may have
information about future growth developments and may decide upon entry
accordingly. The introduction of the SMP affects industries differentially and
does so in the second half of the 1980s, which allows us to identify the entry
effect from other factors. Around the implementation of the SMP foreign entry
increased in the United Kingdom, as shown in Figure 1. The estimation results
indicate that more foreign entry measured by a higher share of industry em-
ployment in foreign ﬁrms has led to faster total factor productivity growth of
domestic incumbent ﬁrms and thus to faster aggregate productivity growth. Our
interpretation of the results is that at least a part of the impact of entry is to spur
on growth in incumbents by increasing the incentives of those close to the
technological frontier to escape entry by innovating.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches a theoretical frame-
work that links entry threat to industrial performance. Section 3 reports empir-
ical ﬁndings of the impact of foreign entry on productivity of domestic incum-
bents using U.K. microlevel panel data. Section 4 brieﬂy concludes.
FIGURE 1. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and share of foreign ﬁrm employment, 1981–1993.
Source: Authors’ calculations using ONS data and other data sources. All statistical results remain
Crown Copyright.
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The following model is a reduced-form version of the growth model with entry
in Aghion, Blundell, Grifﬁth, Howitt, and Prantl (2003), or ABGHP. This itself
builds on the discrete-time version of the Schumpeterian growth model in
Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2003) and on ABRZ.
2.1. A Simple Multisector Schumpeterian Growth Model
All agents live for one period. In each period t a ﬁnal good (henceforth the
numeraire) is produced by a competitive sector using a continuum of interme-
diate inputs, according to the technology:
yt 
0
1
At
1xt
 d.
xt() is the quantity of the intermediate input produced in sector  at date t, At()
is a productivity parameter that measures the quality of the intermediate input 
in producing the ﬁnal good, and   (0, 1). The ﬁnal good can be used either
for consumption, or as input in the process of producing intermediate goods, or
for investments in innovation.
In each intermediate sector  only one ﬁrm (a monopolist) is active in each
period. Thus the variable  refers to both an intermediate sector, and to the
intermediate ﬁrm which is active in that sector. As any other agent in the
economy, intermediate producers live for one period only and property rights
over intermediate ﬁrms are transmitted within dynasties. Intermediate ﬁrms use
labor and capital in form of the ﬁnal good as inputs. As shown in Acemoglu,
Aghion, and Zilibotti (2003), the equilibrium proﬁt for each intermediate ﬁrm
will take the form:
t  At, (1)
where
 
1

 1
1

2

1
1
.
2.2. Technology and Entry
Let A 
t denote the new frontier productivity at date t and assume that
A  t  A  t1
with   1.
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productivity level At1()  A 
t1 (type-1 sector ), far below the frontier, with
productivity level At1()  A 
t2 (type-2 sector ), or very far below the
frontier, with productivity level At1()  A 
t3 (type-3 sector ).
Before they produce and generate proﬁts, ﬁrms can innovate to increase
their productivity. Each innovation increases the ﬁrm’s productivity by a factor
. For an innovation to be successful with probability z a type-j intermediate
ﬁrm with j  {1, 2} at date t must invest
ctz  1/2cz
2Atj.
However, as a result of knowledge spillovers, type-3 ﬁrms are automatically
upgraded by one step, so they do not need to invest in innovation.
Intermediate ﬁrms are subject to an entry threat from foreign producers that
are at date t assumed to operate with the end-of-period frontier productivity, A 
t.
Let p denote the probability that an entrant shows up.
5 Reducing entry costs
corresponds to an increase in p.
If the foreign ﬁrm manages to enter and competes with a local ﬁrm which
has a lower productivity, it takes over the market and becomes the new
incumbent ﬁrm in the sector. If it competes with a local ﬁrm which has the same
productivity, however, Bertrand competition drives the proﬁts of both the local
and the foreign ﬁrm to zero. Now, suppose that potential entrants observe the
postinnovation technology of the incumbent ﬁrm before deciding whether or not
to enter. Then the foreign ﬁrm will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter only if the local ﬁrm
has a postinnovation productivity level below the frontier productivity level A 
t.
However, the foreign ﬁrm will never enter in period t if the local ﬁrm has
achieved the frontier. Therefore, the probability of actual entry in any interme-
diate sector , is equal to zero if the local ﬁrm  was initially close to the frontier
and has successfully innovated, and it is equal to p otherwise.
2.3. Equilibrium Innovation Investments
Using (1), together with the innovation technology described above, we can
analyze the innovation decisions by those intermediate ﬁrms that are close to the
frontier and by those far below the frontier. Firms that are initially far below the
frontier at date t choose their investment so as to maximize expected proﬁts net
of R&D costs, namely:
max
z
z1  pA  t1  1  z1  pA  t2  1/2cz
2A  t2	,
5. In ABGHP (2003) we endogeneize this probability by making entry depend upon the
realization of a random entry cost that must be incurred by a potential entrant at the beginning of
the period. Then, the probabilities p1 and p2 of entry in type-1 and type-2 sectors will differ in
general, although they become arbitrarily close to each other when /c tends to 0.
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z2 

c
1  p  1. (2)
Firms that are initially close to the frontier choose their investment so as to:
max
z
zA  t  1  z1  pA  t1  1/2cz
2A  t1	
so that:
z1 

c
  1  p. (3)
Straightforward differentiation of equilibrium innovation intensities with
respect to p, yields:
	z1
	p
 /c 
 0;
	z2
	p
   1/c  0.
In other words, increasing the threat of foreign entry (e.g., through decreasing
entry costs by deregulating) encourages innovation in advanced ﬁrms and
discourages it in backward ﬁrms. The intuition for these comparative statics is
immediate. The higher the threat of entry, the more instrumental innovations
will be in helping incumbent ﬁrms already close to the technological frontier to
retain the local market. However, ﬁrms that are already far behind the frontier
have no chance to win over a potential entrant. Thus, in that case, a higher threat
of entry will only lower the expected net gain from innovation, thereby reducing
ex ante incentives to invest in innovation. Productivity growth by incumbent
ﬁrms that are either close to the frontier or far from it will be affected by entry
threat through its effect on innovation incentives.
2.4. Average Productivity Growth
Finally, one can derive the steady-state fractions of type-j sectors, qj, using the
steady-state ﬂow equations:
p1  q1  1  p1  z1q1, (4)
1  p1  z1q1  pq2  1  p1  z2q2,
1  p1  z2q2  pq3,
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q1  q2  q3  1,
and the right-hand sides of (4) refer to the net ﬂows of sectors into type-j,
whereas the right-hand sides refer to the net ﬂows out of type-j.
Using a Taylor approximation, one can show:
6
PROPOSITION 1. The average rate of productivity growth among incumbent
ﬁrms:
G    1q1z1  q2z2  q3
is increasing in entry threat p for /c sufﬁciently small.
In particular, for plausible values of the R&D cost parameter c, which we
obtain when we calibrate the model to generate observed levels of R&D
intensity and of productivity growth rates at the ﬁrm level, an increased threat
of entry has a positive effect on the average rate of productivity growth among
incumbent ﬁrms. This is the prediction we confront with empirical evidence in
the following section.
3. Empirical Analysis
For the empirical analysis we use microlevel panel data on total factor produc-
tivity growth of British establishments in 166 four-digit industries in the
manufacturing sector between 1980 and 1993. The data is taken from the
Annual Respondents Database (ARD) that contains the microdata underlying
the Annual Census of Production. It is collected by the Ofﬁce for National
Statistics (ONS) under the 1947 Statistics of Trade Act and response is man-
datory. Detailed information on inputs and outputs, the industry classiﬁcation
and basic ownership data is available for a random stratiﬁed sample of estab-
lishments.
7 Data on employment, industry classiﬁcation, and ownership is
available for the underlying population of British production plants and is used
here for constructing the entry measure.
3.1. Estimated Equations and Measures
In the empirical analysis we focus on an equation of the form:
Yijt    Ejt  i  tt  ijt (5)
6. See ABGHP.
7. See Barnes and Martin (2002), Grifﬁth (2001), and Oulton (1997) for details. About 70% of
all establishments are single plants; all others represent groups of plants operating within the same
four-digit industry and owned by the same ﬁrm.
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Y denotes incumbent ﬁrm performance measured by total factor productivity
(TFP) growth, and E is a measure of entry.
We calculate growth in TFP using a superlative index (Caves, Christensen,
and Diewert 1982a, 1982b). Actual entry is measured by the change of the share
of four-digit industry employment that is in foreign plants.
8 What we know
about FDI and foreign plant employment for the time period under investigation
suggests that the variation of this measure is strongly driven by entry of new
foreign plants or entry of foreign producers via takeover. However, it also picks
up employment changes due to expansions, contractions, and exits of plants
under foreign ownership. We focus on foreign entry since this accords most
directly with the theory where we assume that entrants enter at the technological
frontier.
To instrument actual entry we use cross-industry and time series variation
in U.K. product market regulation that is triggered by the introduction of the
E.U. Single Market Program (SMP). In particular, we use indicators of three-
digit industries that were ex ante expected to be strongly or moderately affected
during the EU SMP implementation between 1988 and 1992 or after its
implementation from 1993 onwards.
9 In addition we use the U.S. research and
development intensity measured on the two-digit industry level to capture the
technological situation in the United States where many entrants into the United
Kingdom originate.
Our reduced form equation for entry is:
Ejt  Z
 jt  i  tt  vijt, (6)
with
EvijtZjt, i, tt  0 (7)
where Zjt denotes the instruments.
We control for different permanent levels of TFP growth across establish-
ments and common macroshocks by including establishment-speciﬁc ﬁxed
effects i and time dummies tt. However, these may not be sufﬁcient to remove
all spurious correlation between entry and TFP growth. In particular, relative
changes in the foreign entry measure across industries may be indirectly caused
by shocks to TFP growth. Our approach to remove such correlations is to use
variables on U.K. product market policies and on the U.S. technological situa-
tion as excluded instruments that determine changes in the share of industry
employment in foreign ﬁrms but have no direct effect on the growth of TFP in
incumbent British establishments.
The estimation sample consists of 32,339 observations on 3,827 domestic
8. We use the data on the plant population underlying the ARD to construct this measure.
9. See Grifﬁth (2001) and Mayes and Hart (1994).
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ployees in one year between 1980 and 1993 and as surviving for at least four
years. This group of ﬁrms is most closely aligned with the type of incumbent
considered in the theoretical analysis.
3.2. Empirical Results
Table 1 presents regression results using the sample as described previously
and weighting each observation by the inverse of the establishment’s sam-
pling probability times its size (as measured by employment). We ﬁrst
regress TFP growth rates at the establishment level on the industry level
measure of foreign entry, controlling for common macro shocks and unob-
served four-digit industry characteristics. We see that the impact of foreign
entry on incumbents’ TFP growth is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in
this OLS regression. This result is in line with the expectation derived in
Proposition 1 of the theoretical analysis. In column 2 of Table 1 we use
establishment-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects to control for permanent differences in
the level of TFP growth across establishments that are correlated with
entry—for example, the possibility that entry drives out ﬁrms with con-
stantly low growth rates and thus raises aggregate productivity growth
simply due to this type of selection effect. In this regression the positive
effect of foreign entry on incumbents’ TFP growth remains remarkably
stable and statistically signiﬁcant.
TABLE 1. The effect of foreign entry on total factor productivity growth of domestic incumbents
Dependent variable: growth of total factor productivityijt
Independent variables OLS OLS IV IV
Change(foreign plant employment)jt 0.0857** 0.0840* 0.3814*** 0.3823**
(0.0397) (0.0430) (0.1444) (0.1752)
Year indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit industry indicators Yes Yes
Establishment ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Test results
Exogeneity of change(foreign plant
employment)jt, t-statistic 2.12** 1.72*
Overidentifying restrictions, 
2-Statistic
(# restrictions) 29.42(30) 32.40(30)
Signiﬁcance of policy indicators and
U.S. R&D intensity in 1st-stage
regression, F-statistic 4.71(31)*** 18.71(31)***
#(observations) 32,339 32,339 32,339 32,339
Notes: OLS regression results with robust standard errors in brackets are displayed. Standard errors are clustered on the
4-digit industry level. Observations are weighted by the inverse of their sampling weight times their employment. The
sample consists of 32,339 observations on 3,827 domestic incumbent establishments between 1981 and 1993.
*** (**, *) indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, (5%, 10%) signiﬁcance level.
Source: Authors’ calculations using ONS data and other data sources. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright.
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geneity of the actual foreign entry measure. We use instruments indicating
three-digit industries that were ex ante expected to be affected by the EU SMP
and the U.S. research and development intensity. F-tests, shown at the bottom
of Table 1, indicate that this set of instruments is jointly signiﬁcant in the
reduced form regressions. The tests of overidentifying restrictions indicate no
rejection of overidentiﬁcation in the 2SLS regressions. When instrumenting we
ﬁnd conﬁrmation for a positive foreign entry effect on incumbents’ TFP growth.
The coefﬁcient increases in magnitude, which indicates a negative endogeneity
bias. The entry effect is economically signiﬁcant. For example, consider the
estimates in Column 3 and the descriptive statistics in Table A in the Appendix:
increasing the change in the share of four-digit industry employment in foreign
ﬁrms with a mean of 0.0044 (i.e., about 0.5 percentage points) in our sample by
one standard deviation (i.e., by 0.0336) would result in a rise of the average
growth rate of incumbents’ TFP by 1.3 percentage points. The ﬁnal column in
Table 1 shows similar 2SLS estimation results when using establishment-
speciﬁc ﬁxed effects.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have used microlevel panel data to show that foreign entry
into the United Kingdom has led to faster total factor productivity growth
in domestic incumbent ﬁrms and thus to faster aggregate productivity
growth. This result is robust to using information on the E.U. Single Market
Program as a major policy reform and information on the technological
situation abroad to control for endogeneity of foreign entry. Our identiﬁca-
tion strategy was to use the cross-industry and time series variation in these
instrumental variables to identify the entry effect from other factors.
Our interpretation of the presented results is that entry spurs growth in
incumbents by inducing those close to the technological frontier to innovate
in order to escape entry. However, there are alternative interpretations. For
example, the aggregate total factor productivity growth effect may be driven
by a selection effect. Entrants may drive incumbents with poor growth
performance out of the market. The fact that our results are robust to
allowing for each individual establishment to have a different permanent
level of total factor productivity growth that may be correlated with entry,
suggests that this second interpretation does not explain all of the variation.
Another interpretation is that entrants demonstrate new methods and goods
to incumbents, and thus their superior methods spillover to domestic ﬁrms.
In ongoing work, ABGHP (2003), we investigate the relevance of the
different mechanisms by also looking directly at innovation output. We can
show that entry substantially affects incumbents’ innovative activity.
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